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 Abstract 
 
Illocutionary force and modality are grammatical phenomena that are traditionally considered to 
operate at a ‘high level’, scoping over entire clauses and represented in the upper regions of the 
syntactic tree or of the semantic representation. This is supported by the observation that (most) 
subordinate clauses do not have their own illocutionary force, but depend on the main clause in this 
respect. Still, English exhibits a number of constructions where an NP appears to come with its own 
illocution, independent of the illocutionary force of the clause of which the NP is a part. In other 
languages as well, NPs are known to occur with illocutionary and modality operators. In this article, 
several of these constructions will be brought together, and it is then considered how they can be 
accounted for in two closely related structural-functional syntactic theories, namely Role and 
Reference Grammar and Functional Discourse Grammar. It is shown that both approaches can 
accommodate these odd constructions, provided a number of minor adjustments are made to the 
technical apparatus. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The category ‘mood’ comprises a vast array of semantic and pragmatic notions. In this article, I follow 
Hengeveld (2004a), who uses mood as a cover term for the two subcategories of illocution and 
modality. The former can be seen as the linguistic expression of speech act distinctions, while the 
latter is concerned with the evaluation of the content of the speech act on the axes of desirability or 
probability. This view on mood is reminiscent of Bybee’s (1985) working definition of mood, which 
states that it “signals how the speaker chooses to put the proposition into the discourse context” 
(Bybee 1985:165), and in line with what she argues, only the axis of probability will be taken into 
consideration when dealing with modality in this article, thus ignoring deontic modality (Bybee 
1985:166). 
Common to both illocution and (subjective) modality is that they belong to what in functional 
linguistic theories is generally known as the interpersonal domain. This domain captures everything 
that is not concerned with the descriptive function of language - the representation of reality - but 
expresses the speaker’s view on this representation or the interaction between speakers and 
addressees. As such, interpersonal notions resist truth-conditionality and in formal theories they 
were traditionally relegated to the domain of pragmatics, although recently there have been several 
attempts to integrate interpersonal notions such as illocutionary force in the syntactic structure (see 
Rizzi, 1997; Cinque, 1999; Speas & Tenny, 2003). 
 The question is where mood distinctions are situated in the hierarchical semantic or syntactic 
structure. This is not always easy to assess, and many theories remain silent on the topic. In formal 
theories this is often due to the fact that syntax is not supposed to deal with pragmatic notions; in 
functional theories, on the other hand, the reason is often that they eschew hierarchical structures. 
The Emergent Grammar approach (Hopper, 1987, 1998) or, more generally, West-Coast 
Functionalism (see McGregor, 1997, Noonan, 1999, Butler, 2003a:49-54 for this term), for instance, 
argues that syntactic structure is constantly mediated through language use, and a particular 
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hierarchical structure is hence always of a temporary, contingent nature. This is not to say that in 
such a view there are no universal tendencies concerning scope differences between grammatical 
categories, but a fully detailed blueprint of how different grammatical notions hierarchically relate to 
one another is hard to come by. This article will take a functional perspective, but in order to be able 
to make precise claims on the structural position of mood, we will only look at so-called ‘structural-
functional theories’ - the term Butler (2003a, b) uses for functional theories which take grammar to 
be a system of interlocking rules and structures without assuming the autonomy of syntax with 
regard to semantics - which do have elaborate semantic-syntactic template structures. Butler (2003a, 
b) focuses on three structural-functional theories, namely Functional Grammar, Role & Reference 
Grammar and Systemic Functional Grammar. Of these three theories, Functional Grammar and Role 
& Reference Grammar make the clearest predictions on the status of illocution and various types of 
modality. Indeed, the account in terms of layering in both frameworks is highly comparable, despite 
the conceptual differences (Butler, 1996:8 and see further Section 3). Systemic Functional Grammar 
is less clear in this respect (Butler, 1996:12-13 and also Butler, 2003b:56-57 with regard to illocution 
in particular). As a consequence, Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004) will be 
ignored in what follows, and the discussion of ‘unusual’ mood, the main topic of this article, will be 
described in Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008), the latest version of 
Dik’s (1997a, b) Functional Grammar, and Role & Reference Grammar (see Van Valin, 2005 for the 
most recent version). 
 Let us now look in somewhat more detail at each of the two subclasses of mood. 
Illocution can be expressed through so-called illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs), 
morphosyntactic or prosodic markers that mark the illocutionary force, such as word-order, special 
intonation contours etc. Apart from such IFIDs languages may also possess elements that modify, 
rather than indicate the illocutionary force. Dutch, for instance, has several particles such as maar or 
wel that can be used to either emphasise or downplay the illocutionary force (Vismans, 1994). 
Another type of modifiers are the so-called illocutionary adverbs, like honestly, in sum, frankly, which 
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in specific contexts, like for instance (1)-(3), do not modify the proposition itself, but rather the 
illocution. Under an earlier analysis, these adverbs were seen to modify covert speech act verbs (I 
declare honestly ...) (see Ross’s 1970 ‘performative deletion’), but the postulation of such a verb is 
not without problems (see Lyons, 1977:782-784; Levinson, 1983:255-263), and an alternative analysis 
may be proposed in which these adverbs modify the (abstract) illocutionary force (see Hengeveld & 
Mackenzie, 2008:81-82).1 
 
(1) Honestly, no man is safe at this time of year (BNC) 
(2) In sum, culture provides no secure foundation for defining a national group (BNC) 
(3) Frankly, it is not an outstanding record of achievement (BNC) 
 
A third type of illocutionary modification, related to the illocutionary adverbs in (1)-(3), are 
subordinate clauses that motivate the speaker’s speech act, as in (4)-(5) (see Davison, 1981; Van der 
Auwera, 1986; Sweetser, 1990). In these examples, the subordinate clause modifies the speech act, 
rather than the propositional content. 
 
(4) Well, since you are so interested, this is my cousin come from the Neath Valley to help in the 
business (BNC) 
(5) If you are hungry there's some cheese (BNC) 
 
Epistemic modality can be expressed through verbal morphology, through auxiliaries, and through 
adverbs. Of these devices, verbal morphology plays only a marginal role in the expression of modality 
in present-day English. Auxiliaries and adverbs however, are widely used, see (6)-(7). 
                                                 
1
 English examples are either drawn from the BNC corpus (see http://corpus.byu.edu/bnc), or from a self-
assembled stock of anecdotal internet examples, found with the aid of Google. The former are indicated with 
(BNC), the latter with (IC). Constructed examples are indicated with (CE). 
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(6) He might be dead. (BNC) 
(7) He is probably a murderer himself (BNC) 
 
In most linguistic approaches, mood is a category that is accommodated at a high level in the 
semantic and/or syntactic structure: illocutionary force is a property of full, independent clauses. 
Indeed, the presence of illocutionary force is sometimes taken as a watershed between parataxis and 
hypotaxis (see Lehmann, 1988), although there has been some debate about whether illocutionary 
distinctions can play a role in finite subordinate clauses as well (see e.g. Bolkestein, 1992). Still, the 
idea that expressions without a finite verb, let alone without a verb, can be adorned with 
illocutionary modifiers of their own is hardly ever held. The same is true, to some extent, of 
epistemic modality.2 Epistemic modality is a speaker’s judgment of the factual status of the whole 
proposition, and as such, it has scope over the entire proposition (see Palmer, 2001:8-9 on 
“propositional modality”). This motivates why epistemic modality expressed by adverbials is often 
realised in the left periphery of the clause and why mood morphology is expressed more peripherally 
to the verbal core than tense or aspect inflection (see Bybee, 1985). 
 Still, in a number of languages, including English, illocution and epistemic modality can 
operate on a far lower level in the semantic-syntactic tree than is commonly assumed. In this article, 
it is argued that NPs can have their own illocution, independent of the illocution of the clause it is a 
part of, and can be modified by epistemic modal markers. This is not to say that NPs are always 
                                                 
2
 In recent work, the traditional epistemic domain is often subdivided in reportative, evidential and epistemic 
modality, or in a subset of these. The exact divisions between these terms is not always very clear and some 
scholars have argued that evidentiality is not really on a par with other modal categories, but rather a 
functional category sui generis. To complicate matters even more, the distinction between subjective and 
objective modality cross-cuts the whole domain (see Hengeveld, 2004a). The delineation within the epistemic 
domain will be discussed in Section 3. 
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marked for illocution and modality or that illocution and modality are not by default linked with the 
entire clause, but rather that mood operators occasionally can scope over items smaller than the full 
clause. 
Such NP-level mood expressions call for a number of revisions of most of the extant 
grammatical models. In this paper the focus is on the consequences for the functionally oriented 
models Role & Reference Grammar (RRG) and Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG). 
Despite the differences between these two models (see Section 3), a common solution for 
the representation of the phenomena discussed in the data section of this paper can be put forward, 
which consists in allowing mood operators (or frames) for illocution and subjective modality to be 
inserted at a sub-clausal level. For RRG, this involves adding an extra layer in the structure of the NP. 
As will be shown, this has additional advantages beyond the accommodation of NP-internal mood 
features. For FDG, the greater flexibility of the Illocutionary Frame cuts deeper in the model’s extant 
architecture, but it is not an unworkable solution. The remainder of this article consists of three main 
sections. First, a number of remarkable constructions will be presented in Section 2, in which 
illocution operates at levels where it should not be found according to the traditional theory of 
layering. Then, in Section 3, the position of illocution and epistemic modality in the layered structure 
of the clause will be discussed. The next section (Section 4) is devoted to the question how the 
models are to be altered in order to be able to account for these problematic constructions. 
 
2 NP-internal mood constructions 
 
In most theories that have elaborate syntactic and/or semantic structures illocution and epistemic 
modality are situated high up in the layered structure, whereas the NP arguments are deep down 
near the predicate. One motivation for this idea is that these mood categories have scope over other 
operators, and in semantically driven frameworks like RRG and FDG scope is a key element in 
determining the nature of the various layers. A second piece of evidence is that subordinate clauses 
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as a rule cannot have their own illocution, while they can have their own tense and aspect operators 
(see e.g. Verstraete, 2005). This is all well established, and can be illustrated by the examples under 
(8)-(9) (from Verstraete, 2005:614), where the coordinate structure allows for different illocutionary 
force in the two conjoined main clauses (declarative, interrogative, imperative), see (8a-c), which is 
not possible in examples (9a-c) with subordination. 
 
(8a) John was imprisoned, but he didn’t rob the bank. 
(8b) John was imprisoned, but did he really rob the bank? 
(8c) John was imprisoned, but don’t forget that he robbed the bank! 
 
(9a) John was imprisoned after he robbed the bank. 
(9b) *John was imprisoned after didn’t he rob the bank? 
(9c) *John was imprisoned after do keep in mind that he robbed the bank! 
 
In this section, a number of constructions will be discussed in which NPs have their own illocution, 
independent of the illocution of the clause they are part of or their own epistemic modal operators 
or modifiers. It should be pointed out that we are not concerned here with the kind of constructions 
mentioned by Sadock & Zwicky (1985:187-188) such as (10). Here the NP is used in isolation and 
hence can be argued to form a sentence on its own. Nor will constructions where a predicate 
nominal carries modal morphemes be taken into account, like e.g. (11) (from Kornfilt, 1997:79). Here 
the reported past suffix -mIş is attached to the predicate nominal öğretmen, but it cannot be used 
with an NP functioning as a referential subject or object . In cases like (10) and (11), the mood on the 
nominal falls together with the clausal mood. 
 
(10) a beer, please 
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(11) TURKISH 
(ben)  öğretmen -miş  -im 
 I teacher  -REP.PAST -1SG 
 ‘I was/am a teacher (so they say) 
 
This paper, however, is concerned with mood distinctions in NPs that are part of a sentence that has 
its own mood operators. In other words: the illocutionary force of the NP is independent of the 
illocutionary force of the sentence it belongs to, and the modality of the NP pertains to the NP only. 
Three types of such NPs will be discussed: (i) NPs that have their own illocution; (ii) NPs that are 
accompanied by adverbial illocutionary and modal modifiers; (iii) nouns with mood affixes. 
 
2.1 NP-internal illocution 
 
Illocution is normally associated with full clauses, but occasionally, we find expressions in English 
where the illocution operates locally. In examples (12)-(16) the NPs printed in bold have their own 
illocution, independent of the illocution of the clause. 
 
(12) His grandmother is still married and is currently living in this cottage in ... France? (CE) 
 
(13)  I had a vague recollection somebody said he had this pet shop at Blagden or som not Blagden 
er Blagden? (BNC, sic) 
 
(14) Right You know you were talking about them deleting all er references? (BNC) 
 
(15) Our Senior Director of Interactive Design, Weszt, came up with what an amazing new design 
(IC) 
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(16) I was impressed with what a wonderful job that both Brian and the gentleman that worked 
with him completed. (IC) 
 
NP-internal illocutionary force can be illustrated with the simple example in (12). There is clearly an 
interrogative illocution that does not belong to the main clause, as the latter has declarative 
illocution. The only part that is questioned is the NP that forms the complement of the preposition 
in: the NP France. The same is the case in the examples (13)-(14), where the interrogative illocution 
can be argued to be restricted to the final NP. In (13), e.g., the fact that the person being talked 
about had a pet shop is not at issue. Rather it is questioned whether the pet shop was located at 
Blagden. Example (14) is less clear, but at least under one possible reading, the ‘deleting’ of 
something is asserted, while the exact nature of what has been deleted is questioned. In (15) and 
(16), the NP that is the complement of the preposition with has mirative illocution.3 The illocutionary 
force of the NP is not just pragmatically inferred, but is encoded by the typical rising intonation, 
which is an IFID for interrogative illocution, and in (15)-(16), the pronoun what functions as an IFID 
for mirative illocution. 
Similar examples of distributed illocution were given in Lakoff (1988 [1974]), on which he 
pessimistically commented in his 1988 epilogue to the article: 
 
“These sentences even defied the theory of speech acts, since they had not one overall 
illocutionary force, but many illocutionary forces, some embedded within others. No theory 
                                                 
3
 I use the term ‘mirative illocution’, rather than ‘exclamative illocution’ following Hengeveld & Mackenzie 
(2008:66-67, 73), who argue that exclamative force is an emphatic operator on basic illocutions (see also 
Moutaouakil 2005): declaratives, interrogatives, imperatives can all be expressed as [+ exclamative] or [– 
exclamative]. 
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of speech acts, then or now, has been devised to account for the speech act forces of such 
cases” (Lakoff, 1988:45). 
 
One could object that constructions like (12)-(14) are unnatural or very infrequent. While it is true 
that they are hard to come by in traditional text corpora, they are, however, not at all 
ungrammatical, and the reason for their infrequency may simply be that they mainly occur in spoken 
discourse, and are not likely to be written down. Indeed, the BNC examples all come from the spoken 
discourse sections. Another reason why they are hard to retrieve from a corpus is that their concrete 
form varies widely which makes it difficult to query them electronically.4 Moreover, the rarity of 
these constructions is not a good argument for not taking them into consideration. Valuable insights 
can be gained from looking at the fringes of syntax (see Wohlgemuth & Cysouw, 2010a, b and Simon 
& Wiese, 2011). 
Another objection to the idea that (12) features illocutionary force inside the NP could be 
that in those sentences illocutionary force operates at the clause level throughout, but that the 
declarative illocution switches to interrogative in the middle of the sentence, at the place where the 
suspension dots or the hesitation markers are. In other words: the speaker starts out with a 
declarative illocution, but then changes her mind, so to speak, and turns her proposition into a 
question. The examples in (12)-(14) would then be cases of anacolutha, in which the regular syntax 
breaks down due to a sudden change in the speaker’s discourse plan. Support for this account is the 
use of hesitation markers, which may signal the processing difficulties in the discourse 
reorganisation. One could object that this would miss the semantic point that only the NP France is 
questioned in (12), not the entire proposition. In other words: the speaker does not want to convey 
that reasons have cropped up mid-sentence to doubt the positive assertion of the already uttered 
proposition, rather only a specific part, namely the exact location (France), is put into question. This 
                                                 
4
 For NP-internal interrogative illocution, I looked for the hesitation marker ‘er’, as is obvious from examples 
(13)-(14). 
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objection can be countered by analysing a sentence like (12) as an amalgamation of two different 
sentences, each with their own illocution, to wit His grandmother is still married and is currently 
living in this cottage in France and Was it really France? 5 This would be consonant with the 
observation that it is only France which is questioned. So in principle, the examples given in (12)-(16) 
could be analysed as instances of the Sadock & Zwicky type of NP-illocution exemplified in (10). Still, 
given that we need to recognise an illocutionary variable inside the NP anyway, as will become clear 
in the next section, the analysis of (12)-(16) as local illocution does not burden the grammar with an 
ad hoc category. Such an analysis has the advantage that no deletion of verbal material is needed in 
the process of amalgamating two sentences. 
The same can be argued with regard to example (15). The NP what an amazing new design 
has mirative illocution, again independent of the (declarative) illocution of the main clause. There is 
thus a fundamental difference between this example and those under (17)-(18), where the mirative 
illocution pertains to the entire sentence, which takes the characteristic form of a question word 
without inversion:6 the focussed NP with the wh-determiner is in fronted position, contrary to what 
is the case in example (15).7 
 
(17) What an amazing new design this is! 
(18) What an amazing new design our Senior Director of Interactive Design, Weszt, came up with! 
 
                                                 
5
 I want to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion. 
6
 As an alternative to the question word what, the determiner some can be used as well, as one reviewer points 
out. 
7
 In some approaches, sentences like (17)-(18) are analysed as having NP-internal illocution as well, and are set 
off against examples where the what-operator is used on its own, rather than inside an NP, see e.g. Bennis et 
al. (1998:104-107), on the Dutch counterpart of this construction. 
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Example (15) is not an isolated attestation, as is shown by (16), and scores of other examples can 
readily be found on the internet.8 
As for the use of the hesitation markers in (12)-(14), this may partly be due to the way in 
which the corpus was queried (see fn. 4), and even then, the hesitation marker is certainly not always 
present. 
Again, one could maintain that the examples in (15)-(16) are perhaps not cases of NP-internal 
illocution, but rather blends of two clauses. Example (15) would then be a syntactic blend of (19) and 
(20). 
 
(19) Senior Director of Interactive Design, Weszt, came up with an amazing new design 
(20) What an amazing new design! 
 
This syntactic blend account is particularly useful for cases in which a clause is ‘grafted’ onto the 
matrix clause (see Van Riemsdijk, 2001 for a detailed account of this phenomenon). The interrogative 
and mirative illocution of the NP in (21)-(24) are inherited from the clausal graft, respectively, Was it 
London? and what an amazing crowd pleasers these will be and What a lot of things the Scots have 
given the world! and What terrible news we have to communicate. 
 
(21) saw them play live in...was it london (IC) 
 
(22) you can’t go wrong with WHAT an AMAZING crowd pleaser these will be! (IC) 
 
                                                 
8
 In both (15) and (16), the NPs with mirative illocution are the complement of a PP introduced by with. This 
does not mean that such NPs can only be used in this particular syntactic context, but is simply due to technical 
reasons regarding the search language: by including the preposition in the search string, the abundant 
attestations like (17), in which the mirative illocution is at clause level, are filtered. 
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(23) I passed the time browsing in the windows of the many tourists shops that stand along it, 
reflecting on what a lot of things the Scots have given the world - kilts, bagpipes, tam-o-
shanters, tins of oatcakes, bright yellow jumpers with big diamond patterns of the sort 
favoured by Ronnie Corbett, sacks of haggis- and how little anyone but a Scot would want 
them. (IC, from B. Bryson, Notes from a small island, p.327)  
 
(24) Honoring our heroes is one way to manage with what terrible news we have to 
communicate (IC) 
 
At first sight, example (16) is not different from examples (22)-(24), but upon closer inspection there 
is a structural difference. In (16), the NP what a wonderful job is accompanied by a relative clause, 
that both Brian and the gentleman that worked with him completed. Examples (22)-(24) are 
structurally ambiguous. In (24), for instance, we have to communicate can either be a contact relative 
clause, with what terrible news as its antecedent, or it can be a remnant of a head clause with 
mirative illocution (what terrible news we have to communicate!). I would propose to reserve the 
graft account only for the latter reading. A true syntactic blend would then be (25), rather than (16). 
Here what a wonderful job both Brian and the gentlemen that worked with him completed can stand 
on its own as a mirative sentence, whereas in (16) the presence of that precludes such a reading (at 
least in standard English), and has to be parsed as a mirative NP with a relative clause. 
 
(25) I was impressed with what a wonderful job both Brian and the gentleman that worked with 
him completed. (IC) 
 
We will come back to the distinction between (12)-(16) and (21)-(24) in Section 4, where the 
representation of all these examples in RRG and FDG is discussed. 
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Another construction which may be argued to feature NP-internal illocution are NPs 
introduced by the determiner such, although here the presence of a separate illocution is more 
difficult to maintain on a theory-independent basis. In English, such has two different uses: an 
identifying use and an emphasising or intensifying use (see Bolinger, 1972, Altenberg, 1994 and 
Wood, 2002 for this difference). This is exemplified in (26)-(27). 
 
(26) The examination is set and marked in such a way that it excludes by its very nature from 
Science and Social Studies papers any questions based on the local environment. (BNC) 
 
(27) Reading is such a joy (BNC) 
 
In (26), such cataphorically refers to the relative clause that follows the noun way, and is involved, as 
a regular determiner, in (discourse) identification. In (27), on the other hand, such is not a phoric 
determiner. Rather, it emphasises the NP a joy, by boosting the inherent gradability of the concept 
joy. This intensifying use is not restricted to predicate nominals, but occurs with argument NPs as 
well, see (28). 
 
(28) Or if you don't care for the porridge, there's some of these new Post Toasties. Such a nice 
young American brought them for us (BNC) 
 
 The function of such in examples (27)-(28) is not exactly the same as the degree modifier so. For one 
thing, whereas so and the adjective it modifies can be used as a subject complement, see (29), this is 
not possible with such, see (30). The reason is that such, as part of the determiner complex, has the 
whole NP in its scope, not just the adjective (see Spinillo, 2003:201 and Ghesquière & Van de Velde, 
2011:782-784 for a more extensive argumentation). 
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(29) So loud a noise / the noise was so loud 
(30) Such a loud noise / *The noise was such loud 
 
As an operator (or modifier) of the entire NP, the function of such is to express the unexpected 
nature of the referent, by highlighting its deviance from the norm. This function of such is in fact 
comparable to a mirative operator at the clause level, which similarly marks surprise by unexpected 
information.9, 10 The difference is basically that the mirative determiner such has local scope over the 
NP only, whereas other mirative operators usually have scope over the entire clause. Interestingly, 
the English mirative operator what at clause level etymologically derives from a question word what, 
which is basically deictic in nature. The mirative determiner such draws on the same semantic 
domain, as it historically derives from a deictic determiner for identification (Bolinger, 1972; 
Ghesquière & Van de Velde, 2011). 
Other instances of NPs which have their own illocution are (i) appositional NPs and (ii) NPs in 
the left-dislocated ‘as for NP’ construction, which can both circumvent the sentential illocution, as 
has been argued by Hannay & Keizer (2005:165-166) and Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008:416), 
respectively. In example (31), the as-for PP, containing the NP the nude scene, is not in the scope of 
the interrogative illocution of the main clause, and in example (32), the appositional NP the self 
proclaimed greatest city in the world, semantically does not fall under the interrogative illocution 
either, as it is itself fully asserted.  
 
                                                 
9
 See Zeevat (t.a.) for a similar view on particles such as only as mirative elements expressing surprise. Note 
that these particles can also occur NP-internally as focus particles and as such constitute another category of 
NP-internal mood (see below). 
10
 Note that NPs introduced with such may convey mirative expressions in the form of Sadock & Zwicky 
sentences exemplified in (10):  It was without doubt the most beautiful thing she had ever owned, or ever 
would . Such delicacy, such refinement! (BNC). 
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(31) As for the nude scene, what can one say, except that it is brief and theatrically not very 
effective? (IC) 
 
(32) why does New York - the self proclaimed greatest city in the world - end up with such 
mediocre architecture? (IC) 
 
The NPs-with-illocution in (31)-(32) are, however, not necessarily on a par with the other cases 
discussed above. They are clearly isolated from the main clause by having their own intonation 
contour and by not filling any argument positions, and as such form their own mini-clauses, or 
Discourse Acts, in the terminology of FDG (see Section 3). In this respect they are more closely 
related to the Sadock & Zwicky NPs exemplified in (10). We will come back to the analysis of these 
examples in Section 4. 
 
2.2 NPs with adverbial illocutionary modifiers 
 
The second kind of constructions in which illocutionary features are used in connection to the NP are 
NPs modified by a so-called illocutionary adverb. 
 
(33) I played doumbeck in a band, with honestly the most horrible saggy doumbeck I have ever 
played in my life (IC) 
 
(34) Our young people will, therefore, again and again and again, wash up orphans on Harvard’s 
shores, in search not only of love, but of self-worth, guidance, and acceptance, of, in short, a 
home (IC) 
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(35) it features a bunch of male and female models in frankly the most hilarious poses since 
Zoolander (IC) 
 
(36) Next to a pic of the fairy knitted in, seriously, the drabbest and most depressing hippie-green 
colorss [sic] (IC) 
 
The adverbs in bold (honestly, in short, frankly, seriously) are illocutionary adverbs. These have been 
analysed as modifiers with a covert speech act verb (see Levinson, 1983:255), but as mentioned 
earlier, this analysis has been largely abandoned in favour of an analysis in which the adverbs directly 
modify the illocutionary force. 
 
(37) Honestly, … 
(38) [I say] honestly, … 
 
Normally, these adverbs occupy one of the highest positions in the syntactic tree (see Ramat & Ricca, 
1998:192; Cinque, 1999, 2004). In examples (33)-(36), however, they are inside the PP. This is an 
argument to consider them as modifiers of the NP. This analysis is supported by the semantics: the 
adverbs have only the NP in their scope. In (33), the speaker expresses her honesty about the 
derogatory description that is provided of the doumbeck, not about her playing in a band, which is a 
neutral statement. The same goes for the adverbs in the other examples. In (34) it is only the NP a 
home of which it can be felicitously said, by using in short, that it is a concise expression. In (35), 
frankly semantically clearly extends only to the NP it precedes. And in (36), seriously belongs to the 
description the drabbest and most depressing hippie-green colorss. The most straightforward way to 
represent these adverbs is as peripheral modifiers to the NP, which is the analysis that Payne & 
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Huddleston (2002:331-332, 436) themselves subscribe to.11 They may be preceded and followed by a 
pause, orthographically marked by commas, as in examples (34) and (36), but this is by no means 
necessary, see (33) and (35). Indeed, in (33) and (35), the adverbs are intonationally fully integrated 
in the NP. 
 
(39) [PP with [NP [Peripheral Modifier honestly [Determiner the [ … [Head doumbeck ] … ] ] ] ] ] 
 
Invoking a slot for these adverbs in the NP is not a ‘deus ex machina’, as the slot is needed anyway 
for the presences of other adverbs that are used in connection with the NP, such as focus particles - 
at least in descriptions like Payne & Huddleston’s (2002), which take surface structure as reflecting 
the actual syntactic structure.12 More intricate accounts are available, however, in which the 
peripheral modifier is not really part of the noun phrase (or DP), see e.g. Kleemann-Krämer (2010) 
and references therein. 
 Particles can convey illocutionary-related meanings as well, and such particles can 
occasionally be found in the NP. Dutch and German have modal particles, as in (40), which Foolen 
(1993:36-38), following an earlier account of Wunderlich, argues to function as illocutionary 
modifiers (see also Vismans, 1994). The Dutch particle toch (German doch) has an adversative 
meaning, and often translates in English as ‘nevertheless’, ‘after all’ or ‘even so’. In its use as a modal 
particle, it seems to convey emphasis of a counter-expectational meaning (see also Daalder 
1986:136), which can apply to the propositional content, but also to the illocution. In (40), toch 
modifies the interrogative illocution, by asserting that the speaker has reasons to believe that the 
                                                 
11
 The exact position of the relative clause is not at issue here. It is here inserted above the adjective but under 
the determiner, but other representations can be argued for as well. 
12
 Note that the slot for peripheral modifiers is not the same slot as where the predeterminers all and both go, 
as these quantifiers occur systematically to the right of the peripheral modifiers. This hard ordering constraint 
warrants setting up a different slot for predeterminers. 
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answer will be positive. The particle here skews the possible answers to the positive, and, as a 
consequence, pushes it more in the direction of a declarative.13 In English, this meaning could be 
expressed by stressing the verb, by using an emphatic dummy verb do, by a question tag, or by a 
combination of these strategies. In combination with a declarative, as in (41), toch motivates the use 
of the illocutionary force by going against the implicit stance of an imagined speaker.14 
 
(40) DUTCH 
Hij heeft toch een vriendin? (IC) 
he has PTC a girlfriend 
 ‘He does have a girlfriend, doesn’t he?’ 
 
 (41) DUTCH 
Ik vond het toch belangrijk dat mijn man  aanwezig
 I found it PTC important that my husband present 
was bij de bevalling (IC) 
was with the delivery 
‘I did find it important my husband was there at the delivery.’ 
                                                 
13
 Note that the word order is that of a declarative, rather than an interrogative clause. 
14
 Note that toch in (41) is not the same toch as in Hij is tóch gekomen (‘He did come, in the end’). In this use, 
the meaning of (41) would paraphrase as ‘First I didn’t think it was important, but later I changed my mind’. 
This is not the default reading of (41), which is more like ‘All things considered, and perhaps disagreeing with 
what others think, I do find it important’. I consider the use of toch in (41) as a modal particle, although it can 
be stressed here, which is normally not possible for modal particles. Another problem is the use of toch in 
examples like Wat is ze toch mooi! (‘How beautiful she is!’), where the counter-expectation is more difficult to 
perceive. I follow Daalder (1986:139) in her analysis that toch in such examples expresses a revision of a former 
point of view of the speaker and qualifies as counter-expectational. 
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The particle toch can also be used in combination with an NP, with a meaning that is close to the 
adversative value it has in combination with a declarative illocution. In (42), the adversative modal 
particle toch stresses the felicity of een belangrijke Franse appelatie against the (assumed) opinion of 
the other discourse participant(s). In (43), toch is used in combination with another particle (wel). 
The pragmatic meaning here is ‘contrary to (our own) expectation’, ‘we have to admit’. In (44), toch 
introduces a correction on a previously uttered NP. The contribution of toch is to emphasise the 
felicity of the correction: whatever the status of the first NP, the second NP is definitely asserted. 
 
(42) DUTCH  
Ik vind persoonlijk dat de laatste tijd nogal  minachtend wordt  
I find personally that the latest time rather disdainful is  
gedaan over toch een belangrijke Franse appelatie. (IC) 
done about PTC an important French appellation. 
 ‘Personally I think there have been some rather disdainful comments lately about what is 
still an important French appellation.’ 
 
(43) DUTCH 
De citadel bestond uit vele trappen, die we hebben  
The citadel consisted of many stairs  which we have 
betreden en bovenaan konden we even genieten van toch  
mounted and at-the-top could we a-while enjoy  of PTC 
wel een mooi uitzicht op Namen. (IC) 
PTC a nice view on Namur. 
‘The citadel consisted of many stairs, which we took, and at the top we could enjoy the, after 
all, very nice view on Namur for a while. 
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(44) DUTCH 
iedereen heeft een laserprinter tegenwoordig (of toch een  
everyone has a laserprinter nowadays or PTC a  
high-res inkjet) (IC) 
high-resolution inkjet  
 ‘Everyone has a laserprinter nowadays, or at least a high-resolution inkjet.’ 
 
The difficulties in capturing the exact semantics and pragmatics of modal particles in general, makes 
it difficult to present a convincing case that the NP-internal use of the modal particle toch really has 
an illocutionary value. Still, the adversative value of toch suggests it is involved in conjuring up 
alternative worlds or states, which is crucial to mood: both (interrogative) illocution and epistemic 
modality are basically ways to express alternative perspectives on one proposition (see Timberlake, 
2007:315). This relation between particles and mood is discussed in detail by Vandeweghe (1986). In 
the next section, the link between nominal determination and mood will be further explored, by 
looking at NP-internal mood in languages other than English or Dutch. 
 
2.3 Nouns with mood affixes 
 
Morphological expression of NP-internal illocutionary force is hard to find, but what is attested in the 
typological literature is morphological expression of NP-internal modality. Just like illocution in the 
strict sense, modality is not commonly thought of as a nominal category and it is normally taken to 
operate at the clause level, way above the NP level. Moreover, the boundary between illocution and 
modality is not always very clear-cut. Timberlake (2007:316-317) sees the imperative, the 
interrogative and the declarative, normally considered as illocutionary categories, as extreme forms 
of modality. Also, mirativity is related to evidentiality (see references in Delancey, 2001), and 
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evidentiality belongs to the epistemological-modal domain (see Timberlake, 2007:317).15 
Furthermore, epistemic modality can also be expressed by a first-person present-tense verb such as 
suppose, believe and think, in a construction that is akin to performative verbs executing speech acts  
(see Lyons, 1977:738-739). 
Nordlinger & Sadler (2004:783-785) give examples of noun operators expressing mood 
distinctions that are independent of the mood of the clause the NP is part of. In example (45), the 
noun is combined with a productive morpheme for ‘possibility’, and in example (46), from Lowe 
(1999:282), there is an evidential morpheme. 
 
(45) IATÊ: suffix -këá for ‘possibility’ 
se’t-këá 
‘a possible house, something that has the possibility of being a house’ 
 
(46) NAMBIQUARA 
wa³lin³-su³-nti² 
manioc-CL.BONE.LIKE-OBSERV.REC.PST.GIVEN 
‘this manioc root that both you and I saw recently’ 
 
Other mood affixes can be found in NPs, though they are often reinterpreted as a plain nominal 
category, dealing with referentiality. Rijkhoff (2008a:73, 2008b:817, referring to the work of Craig, 
1977) shows that the Jacaltec exhortative illocution suffix /-OJ/, is used as a non-specificity marker 
when it occurs with nouns. As Craig (1977) herself notices, the overarching meaning in both cases is 
‘irrealis’, a mood category. Another example is Fongbe, which Rijkhoff (2008a:73, 2008b:817), 
drawing on Lefebvre (1998), observes to have a morpheme that marks actuality (realis) in the clause 
                                                 
15
 Timberlake distinguishes between the realm of epistemology and epistemic modality, but concedes that 
“[e]pistemic modality shades into epistemology” (2007:321). 
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and definiteness in the NP, see (47)-(48). This may suggest that definiteness is related to mood 
categories in this language.16 The same is true of the cognate Gbe language Gungbe, which has a 
marker lɔ ́alternatively expressing specificity, as in (49), and “known or familiar” events, as in (50) 
(examples taken from Aboh, 2009:10).  
 
(47) FONGBE 
N ɖú àsç@n ç@@ @@ 
 I eat crab DET 
 ‘I ate the crab (in question/that we know of).’ 
 
(48) FONGBE 
Jan wá ç@@ @@ 
 John arrive DET 
 ‘Actually, John arrived.’ 
 
(49) GUNGBE 
 Súrù xò àfɔ$kpà lç@@ @@ 
 Suru buy shoe SPEC 
 ‘Suru bought this/that shoe’ 
 
                                                 
16
 Some scholars have argued for a link between definiteness and epistemic modality in English as well: 
Cognitive Grammar considers determiners as an epistemic category (Langacker, 1991:89-95). The consequence 
of this stretched conception of epistemicity is that mood, if seen as encompassing the epistemic domain, is 
pervasively present in the NP. Davidse et al. (2008) show that modal adjectives can support the deictic 
function. 
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(50) GUNGBE  
ɖé Súrù hɔ $n lç@@ @@ 
 as Suru fled SPEC 
 ‘AS Suru fled (as we all know)’ 
 
Another case of NP-internal mood is found in Salish, which has a determiner that is built on the root 
kw, which otherwise encodes remote, hypothetical or conjectural meaning, and can also be used as a 
subordinator with mood import (see Himmelmann, 2001:839-840). Matthewson (1996:57) gives the 
following example, where the determiner ku expresses non-assertion of the ‘book’, which in English 
only approximately translates as an indefinite determiner. 
 
(51) ST’ÁT’IMCETS 
təxwp-mín-ɬkan  kəɬ kwu púkw natxw 
 tecwp-mín-lhkan kelh ku pukw natcw 
 buy-APPL-1SG.SUBJ might DET book tomorrow 
 ‘I might buy a book tomorrow.’ 
 
Kroeber (1999:67) argues that these Salish non-referential determiners “typically occur within the 
semantic scope of elements that remove the situation talked about from the realm of actual (present 
or past- reality (...). Such elements include negation, future markers and modals, imperative mood, 
and world-creating (intensional) predicates such as ‘want’, ‘intend’, ‘look for’, and others.”, which 
underscores their affinity with traditional mood categories. 
 NP-internal mood morphology is thus not uncommon, and other determiners with an 
attitudinal overtone, such as the ‘empathetic’ deictic demonstratives in English (Lyons, 1977:677) or 
the honorific determiners discussed in Himmelmann (2001) also testify to the possibility of 
expressing mood or illocution inside NPs, both in English and in a wide range of other languages. We 
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opt for a more restrictive conception of mood, however. If we were to broaden the notion of mood 
to all attitudinal elements, then NPs would be rife with mood, as adjectives like nice easily acquire 
speaker-related attitudinal meaning. 
 
3 Layering and the position of mood in RRG and FDG 
 
Before we discuss the representation of NP-internal mood in RRG and FDG in Section 4, we will first 
present the general lay-out of these frameworks and their treatment of illocution and modality in 
particular in Section 3. 
Both RRG and FDG hold that clauses are not flat structures, but have a hierarchical 
arrangement, represented as a set of layers around a core. A crucial difference is that the layered 
structure of the clause in RRG is primarily syntactic in nature, although it is semantically motivated 
(Van Valin, 1990; Butler, 1996; Butler & Taverniers, 2008:746), whereas FDG has a separate array of 
layers for morphosyntax, for semantics and for pragmatics (Butler & Taverniers, 2008:747). The FDG 
conception is an extension of the account in Dik’s Functional Grammar, where layering was primarily 
semantic in nature (Butler 1996:3). This semantic layering had an effect on the surface linearisation, 
though the latter was not fully determined by it. Similarly in FDG, where the layering at the 
Morphosyntactic Level (see below for details) is sensitive to, but in principle independent of the 
layering at the Representational Level and at the Interpersonal Level (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 
2008:17, 2010:390). Still, in spite of this difference, there is much that is shared in these models and 
there are obvious parallels with more formally oriented frameworks (see Siewierska, 1992). 
Common to many approaches is the idea that there are different levels or domains for 
different functional notions, like illocution, modality, negation, tense etc. In formal approaches, a 
distinction is often made between a CP domain, an IP (or TP) domain and a VP domain, which stand 
in a hierarchical relation: the lowest level is the VP domain (the thematic layer), which deals with 
argument structure. Dominating it is the IP or TP domain (the grammatical layer), where tense, 
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aspect and mood are situated. The most outer layer is the CP domain, where the integration in the 
discourse of the clause is accommodated. It deals with issues such as information structure 
(topicalisation) and illocution (see e.g. Haegeman & Guéron, 1999:520-521, 536-538). Each of these 
domains is further subdivided in additional layers. This arrangement is not unlike the layered 
structure of the clause that is put forward in RRG (see below for details), where the level of the 
Sentence more or less compares to the CP domain, the level of the Clause compares to the IP/TP 
domain, and the Core compares to the VP domain, although there is disagreement between the two 
approaches about the precise location of tense, modality and other categories and there is a 
separate ‘focus structure projection’ in RRG, dealing with information structure. FDG distinguishes 
between an Interpersonal Level, a Representational Level and a Morphosyntactic Level, each with its 
own layered structure (more details below). Though we have again a ternary structure, the match 
with the layered structure of the other approaches is less than perfect. The most important 
difference is that morphosyntax is treated as a separate level, whereas in formal grammar and in 
RRG, the three levels are all syntactic in nature. Another difference is that the hierarchical difference 
between the levels is not discrete. In formal grammar and in RRG, one level begins where the other 
level ends, but in FDG - in contrast to FG - the Levels are really separate components that run partly 
in parallel. That is, the processing of the Interpersonal Level starts before the processing of the 
Representational Level, but the Interpersonal layers are not all fully run through before the 
Representational layers begin to be processed (Hengeveld, 2004b:367-368). Still, there are significant 
similarities between FDG and the other approaches. Illocution and evidentiality e.g. are situated in 
the upper interpersonal levels, whereas tense and aspect are located at the lower representational 
levels. Argument structure, though potentially driven by interpersonal, representational or 
morphosyntactic factors, is managed at the Morphosyntactic Level (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 
2008:316-332 for details). 
I will now sketch the RRG and the FDG account in more detail, to provide the necessary 
background for the proposals in Section 4. 
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In RRG, the syntactic tree is divided into four successive layers. The deepest layer is the 
Nucleus (NUC), which is the syntactic unit right above the Predicate (PRED), usually a verb. Above it is 
the layer of the Core, the layer of the Clause, and the layer of the Sentence. Arguments are attached 
under the level of the Core; modifiers of time and place are then added peripherally to the Core. Van 
Valin (2005:19-21) argues that other adverbs attach to other layers, so that each layer has its own 
periphery. Some languages, like English, have a so-called Precore and/or Postcore Slot (PrCS, PoCS) 
for question words and topicalised elements, and a Left-detached and/or Right-detached Position 
(LDP, RDP) for isolated constituents (see Van Valin, 2005:5-7). Operators in the form of inflectional 
morphemes are represented in a mirror tree, branching downwards. Aspect and lexically derived 
negation are operators at the Nuclear level; event quantification, (root) modality, internal (low-
scope) negation are operators of the Core; status, tense, evidentials and illocutionary force attach to 
the Clause layer. The RRG conception of the layered structure of the clause (LSC) can be represented 
as in Figure 1 (see also Van Valin, 2005:12):17 
 
[Insert Figure 1 ‘The LSC in RRG’ about here] 
 
The arguments and the modifiers in Figure 1 are PPs or NPs, which have a layered structure of their 
own. Concentrating on NPs, the relevant units are: Nucleus, Core and NP. The structure is thus 
reminiscent of the model for the clause - with the exception of the highest layer of the Sentence - 
and this is motivated by the striking similarities between the units (see Chomsky, 1970; Jackendoff, 
1977; Paardekooper, 1980; Abney, 1987; Rijkhoff, 2002, 2008a, b; Van Valin & LaPolla, 1997; 
Bernstein, 2001; Van Valin, 2005). Adjectives are peripherally attached to the Core in the constituent 
projection. Determiners, numerals and nominal aspect (the latter dealing with count-mass 
distinctions, among other things, see Rijkhoff 1991, 2002) are operators at the level of the NP, the 
Core and the Nucleus, respectively. The Noun Phrase Initial Position (NPIP) is reserved for arguments 
                                                 
17
 The focus structure projection, which deals with information structure, is not represented in Figure 1. 
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or satellites in nominalisations, like ‘America’s attack on Iraq’ or ‘Yesterday’s attack on Iraq’. The 
Periphery is used for time and place modifiers in nominalisations. The layered structure of the NP is 
illustrated in Figure 2 (see Van Valin, 2005:25). 
 
[Insert Figure 2 ‘The layered structure of the NP in RRG’ about here] 
 
As was already clear from the representation in Figure 1, illocution is handled at the level of the 
Clause. It is the highest ranking operator, and as such is nowhere near the NPs that function as 
arguments of the Predicate. Consequently, illocution does not play a role in the layered structure of 
the NP. 
Hierarchical layering plays a central role in FDG as well. In order to understand how it is 
conceived, the basic template for the representation of layering has to be introduced, which is as 
follows: 
 
(52) (π vi: h(vi): σ(vi)) 
 
In this predicate logic-like representation, the main element is vi, which stands for any of the various 
kinds of variables that F(D)G makes use of, like p, e, f etc., for Propositional Contents, State-of-Affairs 
and Predicates, respectively. The index i is used to distinguish between separate instances of the 
same variable. The variable vi is preceded by one or more operators π dealing with grammatically 
expressed categories, like e.g. tense, aspect or mood inflections on verbs. The colon is used for 
‘restriction’: the variable vi is narrowed down, by a number of restrictors on its intension. In the 
representation in (52), the variable vi is restricted by a head (h) and by one or more modifiers (σ), like 
e.g. hard in work hard. Both the head and the modifier are functions taking vi as their argument. The 
phrase work hard can thus be represented as v: work(v): hard(v). The head (h) can be complex, and 
this is the way in which the hierarchical layering transpires: the head consists of the same basic 
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template, which is recursively applied to new kinds of variables. In this way, each head constitutes a 
new layer, with its own operators (π) and modifiers (σ). The basic template in (52) can thus be 
expanded as in (53), where vi, vj and vk are variables of an increasingly lower order. 
 
(53) (head of layer n π vi: (head of layer n-1 π vj: (head of layer n-2 π vk: (head of layer n-3 …)(vk): σ(vk))(vj): σ(vj)) (vi): σ(vi)) 
 
The principle behind this technical representation can be illustrated with a simple example. A 
sentence like (54) contains two modifiers on different layers: as in RRG the adverb hard is more 
closely connected to the verbal core than the adverb tomorrow. The former is a modifier of the 
Property (fj), while the latter modifier belongs to the Episode (epi), a variable two layers up. This is 
also the variable to which the future tense operator (futπ) is attached.18 There is a complication, in 
that fj is in fact what is called a ‘Configurational Property’ (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:181-
215): it can be broken down in a number of smaller parts, which are not in a hierarchical relationship 
to each other. These parts are: the verb, represented as a Property (fi), and the argument he, 
represented by a variable for Individuals, xi. Variables that are in a non-hierarchical relationship are 
held together by square brackets.  
 
(54) He will work hard tomorrow 
(55) (futπ epi: (head of ep sim
π ei: (head of e fj: [head of fj (fi:work(fi)) (xi)](fi): hard
σ
 (fj))(ei))(epi): tomorrow
σ
 
(epi)) 
 
The representation in (55) does not show all of the extant layers in FDG. In total five layers are 
distinguished: the deepest layer is the one of what is called the ‘Lexical Property’, a Predicate (f), 
which combines with Individuals (x), to form a Configurational Property (f). Then comes the layer of 
                                                 
18
 The sim operator of the e variable expresses simultaneity (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:173-174 for 
details). 
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the State-of-Affair (e), enfolded in the layer of the Episode (ep), enfolded itself in the outer layer of 
the Propositional Content (p). 
Apart from the ‘layers’, FDG makes a distinction between different ‘levels’. The grammar, or 
‘Grammatical Component’, as it is technically called in FDG, consists of four separate levels: the 
Interpersonal Level (IL), the Representational Level (RL), the Morphosyntactic Level (ML), and the 
Phonological Level (PL).19 Each level is layered in a similar fashion. The layers and their variables that 
have just been discussed (p, ep, e, f etc.) are all part of the Representational Level. At the 
Interpersonal Level, the relevant layered structure is as follows. There are two kinds of Subacts, 
Referential Subacts (R) and Ascriptive Subacts (T), which typically (though not necessarily) 
correspond to Individuals (x) and Properties (f) at the Representational Level. These Subacts are 
executed by the speaker when she summons an Individual or a Property, respectively. Together, 
these Subacts form the Communicated Content (C), constituting the next IL layer. The Communicated 
Content combines with a variable for the Speaker (P1), for the Addressee (P2), and for the Illocution 
(F). At the next layer, we have the variable for the Discourse Act (A). The highest layer of the 
Interpersonal Level is the one that hosts the variable for the Move (M).20 The Morphosyntactic Level 
has as its layers Stems (Xs) and Affixes (Aff), combining into Words (Xw), combining into Phrases (Xp), 
combining into Clauses (Cl), to arrive at the outer layer of the Linguistic Expression (Le). A 
representation of the hierarchical layering within the three levels is given in (56). Note that this is a 
simplified representation, without operators and modifiers:21 
 
(56) IL (MI: (AI: [(FI)(P1)(P2)(CI: [(TI)(RI)](CI))](AI))(MI)) 
                                                 
19
 As it is not of immediate relevance to the present paper, the Phonological Level will be ignored here. 
20
 The common practice in FDG is to use capitals for variables at the Interpersonal Level, lower case letters for 
variables at the Representational Level, and title case for the Morphosyntactic Level. 
21
 It should be stressed that FDG assumes a default correspondence, but not a necessary one-to-one mapping 
of the variables between the different levels. 
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 RL (pi: (epi: (ei: (fj: [(fi)(xi)](fj))(ei))(epi))(pi)) 
 ML (Lei: (Cli: (Xpi: (Xwi [(Xsi)(Affi)](Xwi))(Xpi))(Cli))(Lei))  
 
Noun phrases in FDG have a layered structure of their own (see Hengeveld, 2008), just like in RRG. At 
the Interpersonal Level, typical referential NPs are represented as Referential Subacts (R).22 
Mackenzie (2002:1-2) notes that the execution of a Referential Subact typically entails the execution 
of one or more Ascriptive Sub-Subacts (T) in the case of non-pronominal NPs: in order to refer to a 
particular dog, one has to evoke the property of a dog. The difference between reference and 
ascription compares to what in Cognitive Grammar is called ‘grounding’ vs. ‘type 
instantiation/specification’ (see Langacker, 1991). At the Representational Level, referential NPs are 
represented as an Individual (x) if they refer to concrete physical ‘first-order’ entities (see Lyons, 
1977:442-447 and Mackenzie, 2004 for entities of a different order). NPs referring to time, locations 
and other less prototypical entities are represented by other kinds of variables (see Hengeveld & 
Mackenzie, 2008:132-136). As is argued by Hengeveld (1992), Keizer (1992) and Mackenzie (1992), 
however, the (x) is built on a zero-order property (f). If we ignore the operators and modifiers, we get 
the following representation: 
 
(57) IL (RI: (TI)(RI)) 
 RL (xi: (fi)(xi)) 
 ML (Npi: (Nwi: [(Nsi)(Affi)](Nwi))(Npi)) 
 
                                                 
22
 Non-referential NPs are e.g. predicative complements, incorporated nouns, vocatives etc. (see Hengeveld, 
2008). 
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To each of the Interpersonal and Representational layers operators and modifiers may be attached. 
Operators of R at the Interpersonal Level (ΠR) deal with identifiability and specificity23; operators of x 
at the Representational Level (πx) express location and number; and operators of f at the 
Representational Level (πf) are associated with shape and measure (nominal aspect, see Rijkhoff, 
1991, 2002). Modifiers of R at the Interpersonal Level (ΣR) express interpersonal notions like 
subjective attitude (see Van de Velde, 2007 and Butler, 2008 for an overview of the various 
interpersonal modifiers in the NP); the difference between modifiers of x and modifiers of f can be 
illustrated by the adjective poor (see Hengeveld, 2008): if it is used as an expression of compassion 
(poor man!), it is an interpersonal modifier (ΣR). If it has the meaning of ‘impecunious’, it is an x-
modifier. If it has the meaning of ‘badly skilled’ (a poor doctor), it is an f-modifier. 
Not all kinds of operators and modifiers will be expressed simultaneously in the same NP, of 
course. An example of an NP packed with various modifiers, and its representation in FDG is given 
under (58). TK, TJ and TI are Ascriptive Sub-Subacts, representing the properties oversized, electric and 
chain saw, respectively.24 
 
(58)  that damn oversized electric  chain saw 
  ΠR ΣR σx  σf  x/f 
 IL (idΠ RI: [(TK) (TJ) (TI)](RI): damn
Σ(RI)) 
 RL (remπ xi: ((fi : chain saw (fi)): (electric
σ(fi)))(xi): (oversized
σ(xi))) 
 ML (Npi: -that damn oversized electric chain saw-(Npi)) 
 
                                                 
23
 Identifiability and specificity are two sides of the same coin: identifiability concerns the Speaker’s assessment 
of the status of the referent for the Addressee, whereas specificity indicates identifiability for him/herself (see 
Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:122). 
24
 The demonstrative that is both represented as an identifiability operator of RI at the Interpersonal Level and 
as a remoteness operator of xi at the Representational Level. 
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The position of illocutionary force in relation to the NP is comparable to what is the case in RRG: 
illocution is situated at the F-variable at the Interpersonal Level, way above the R-variable, as is clear 
in the representation under (56). 
 The treatment of modality in FDG is more complex than in its precursor FG or than in RRG. 
Epistemic modality - in its broad sense including reportative and evidential modality (see fn. 2) - is 
distributed over the Interpersonal Level and the Representational Level. This is, in effect, a departure 
from most other functionalist theories (including FG), which treat epistemic modality invariably as an 
interpersonal phenomenon. The reason for relegating plain epistemic modality to the 
Representational Level is that there are scope differences between the reportative markers and the 
other evidential/epistemic markers (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:151-153). Moreover, the 
latter can be embedded in a complement clause, where they can express a viewpoint that is not 
necessarily shared by the speaker, as e.g. in (59). Reportative modality lacks this possibility, see (60). 
 
(59) Mary said that she would presumably/certainly/possibly/... come to the party. 
(60) *Mary said that she would allegedly/reportedly/... come to the party. 
 
This suggests that a finer-grained distinction can indeed be made within the domain of epistemic 
modality. The problem is that other criteria suggest that all epistemic adverbs, both those in (59) and 
those in (60) can be treated together as they behave similarly with regard to other tests for 
subjective or interpersonal status (De Smet & Verstraete, 2006:376-377): they do not allow 
pronominal substitution, and cannot easily be brought under the scope of sentence negation or be 
focussed, see (61)-(63).25 The interpersonal nature of these adverbs is defended in Ramat & Ricca 
(1998:190). 
 
                                                 
25
 Answering a question with a sentence adverbial is not ungrammatical per se, but it is not appropriate as an 
answer to the kind of question-word questions in (61). 
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(61) Q: How/When/Why/... did he marry her? 
A: *Presumably/Certainly/Possibly/Allegedly/Reportedly/... 
 
(62) He didn’t presumably/certainly/possibly/allegedly/reportedly/...marry her. 
 
(63) *Only presumably/certainly/possibly/allegedly/reportedly/... did he marry her. 
 
On the semantic side, both types appear not to affect the truth conditions, suggesting they do not 
belong to the representational semantics. This raises the question whether FDG made the right 
decision to consign the adverbs in (59) to the Representational Level. A case could be made to 
analyse them all as modifiers of the Communicated Content at the Interpersonal Level. The 
reportative adverbs in (60) express that the speaker does not fully commit to the truth of what she is 
saying as she is relying on other people’s views (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:103). In a sense, this 
is not only central to the meaning of reportative markers but of the other epistemic adverbs as well. 
Adverbs like presumably or possibly also signal that the speaker cannot fully commit to what she is 
asserting, perhaps not by explicitly referring to other people’s views, but at least acknowledging that 
other views may exist. Moreover, the current approach to the broad epistemic domain in FDG draws 
a rather confusing boundary between hearsay evidentials, which are interpersonal in nature, and 
perceptual evidentials, which are representational in nature (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:176-
178). Furthermore, the observation that non-reportative evidentials can be used in subordinate 
clauses, see (64), does not necessarily mean that they should be denied interpersonal status. Other 
adverbs which belong the Interpersonal Level such as fortunately (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 
2008:103) can also be found in complement clauses expressing views other than the speaker’s: 
 
(64) Police said the Toyota rammed three cars on the motorway and another on the A556, but 
that fortunately no one had been injured. (BNC)  
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Summarising, it is clear that in RRG and FDG, illocution is situated in the higher layers, and has most 
other functional categories in its scope. For modality, things are more complicated. Reportative 
modality is situated at the Interpersonal Level, and, as this level precedes the Representational Level 
in the production of a linguistic utterance, reportative modality is also high up in the structure. The 
non-reportative evidential and epistemic modals belong to the Representational Level in standard 
FDG, but as they pertain to the Propositional Content, they occupy the higher layers inside this level. 
In an alternative view, these epistemic modals could be analysed as modifying the Communicated 
Content at the Interpersonal Level as well. 
 Glossing over the more fine-grained layering that some of these accounts apply to the modal 
domain, the following representations show the parallels across the frameworks.26 The 
representation in (67) may be altered such that evidential and epistemic modality is treated on the 
same level as reportative modality. 
 
(65) Formal Grammar: [CP Illocution [TP Reportative/Evidential/Epistemic Modality [VP ... ] ] ] 
(66) RRG: [Sentence [Clause Illocution [ Reportative/Evidential/Epistemic -Modality [Core ... ] ] ] ] 
(67) FDG: [Interpersonal Level Illocution [ Reportative Mood ] ] 
[Representational Level [ Evidential/Epistemic Modality ... ] ] 
 
These representations are simplified to highlight the correspondences between the models. A more 
accurate representation should bring out the idea that basic illocution and illocutionary modification 
are operators in RRG, whereas in FDG, basic illocution is a frame and has its own variable, which can 
be modified by illocutionary operators and modifiers. 
 
                                                 
26
 The additional indentation for the Representational Level in the FDG representation in (67) is a way of 
bringing out the idea of  the ‘delayed processing’ of the Representational Level (see above). 
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4 Implications for the models 
 
Having shown that NPs can have their own illocution, their own mood modifiers, and their own mood 
operators in Section 2, it is now time to turn to the question how well the models discussed in 
Section 3 are equipped to account for these constructions, and in what way they need to be 
adjusted. 
The representation of NP-internal mood is more straightforward in the syntactically oriented 
RRG model than in the more semantically oriented FDG model. As FDG represents semantic (and 
pragmatic) notions on a different level from the morphosyntactic representations (see Section 3), 
there is no necessary one-to-one correspondence between form and function. This means that the 
precise morphosyntactic expression of NP-internal mood cannot be taken as an argument for 
preferring one representation over the other. Relying strictly on semantic arguments, several options 
are possible, and it is not easy to decide which one is the best. Concentrating on NP-internal 
illocutionary adverbial modifiers discussed in Section 2.2 for instance, their syntactic position in the 
left-periphery of the NP immediately preceding the demonstratives posits constraints on where they 
can be inserted in the RRG layered structure of the clause. There is a direct relation between their 
semantic adherence to the NP and their linear contiguity, and it is reasonable to insert them in the 
NP layering. In FDG, on the other hand, the morphosyntactic expression is not necessarily a reflection 
of the semantic relations, and a solution whereby the illocutionary modified NP is represented at the 
interpersonal (‘pragmatic’) level as a separate Discourse Act is in principle not incompatible with the 
integration of the NP under one Clause unit at the Morphosyntactic Level. Still, the solution that is 
proposed in this section to represent the phenomena presented in Section 2 falls out in comparable 
ways in both models. It boils down to assuming that illocutionary and modality operators, modifiers 
and frames are not exclusively associated with clause-level entities. 
We will now discuss the possible analyses of NP-internal mood constructions step by step.  
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 The representation of the Sadock & Zwicky example in (10) (a beer, please) is 
straightforward. In FDG, this kind of construction may get the following representation at the 
Interpersonal Level: 
 
(68) IL (MI: [(AI: [(FI: IMPER (FI)) (CI: (RI:(TI)(RI))(CI))](AI)) (AJ: (FJ:pleaseIntj(FJ))(AJ))](MI)) 
 
The Move (MI) consists of two Discourse Acts AI and AJ. The first Discourse Act (AI) consists of two 
components: a frame that deals with the (imperative)27 Illocution (FI) and a component that deals 
with the noun phrase a beer, viz. the Communicated Content (CI). The second Discourse Act (AJ) 
consists of the interjection please, which functions as the head of the Illocution FJ (see Hengeveld & 
Mackenzie, 2008:76-78). CI comprises a Referential Subact (RI), which itself draws upon an Ascriptive 
Sub-Subact (TI). As is clear from the representation, there is no need to furnish RI with an illocution of 
its own. 
This kind of analysis is amenable to representation in RRG as well: in sentences like (10), the 
illocutionary operator is still in its high position in the layered structure. Only there is an atypical 
Nucleus, not consisting of a verb, but rather of a full NP. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 ‘RRG representation of isolated NP’ about here] 
 
The other constructions discussed in Section 2, where mood-enriched NPs do not form isolated ‘mini-
clauses’ on their own, are more difficult to account for in standard RRG and FDG, however. 
In RRG, a possible solution to account for the NPs-with-illocution discussed in Section 2.1 is 
to say that the NP consists of a Clause unit here. This can be represented as in Figure 4. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 ‘RRG representation of NP-internal illocution’ about here] 
                                                 
27
 Alternatively, the imperative illocution could be pragmatically inferred here. 
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The drawback of this representation is that it is not clear why the other clausal layers and the clausal 
operator projection are not inherited in full. If we have a Clause layer in the NP, why are the 
arguments encoded as genitives or prepositional phrases, rather than as plain NPs? A more 
appropriate representation that covers the kinds of constructions discussed in Sections 2.1-2.3 is the 
simple solution of adding an extra nominal layer. In that way we end up with four layers in the NP, 
instead of three. The original outermost layer of the NP can then be renamed as NOM, in order to 
reserve the label NP for the new highest layer. 
 
[Insert Figure 5 ‘Extended version of the layered structure of the NP in RRG’ about here] 
 
In the constituent tree, the new outermost NP layer hosts the kind of illocutionary modifier that was 
discussed in Section 2.2. Scope relations, as reflected in word order, indicate that it ranks above the 
NPIP slot: in (69), the adverb precedes the possessor argument of the nominalisation. 
 
(69) (...) with, honestly, the army’s most ruthless attack of a village since its atrocities in 1995. 
(CE) 
 
[Insert Figure 6 ‘RRG representation of example with NP-internal speech act modifier’ about here] 
  
The mood suffixes on nouns discussed in Section 2.3 are dealt with in the operator projection. The 
Iatê example in (45) can be represented as follows: 
 
[Insert Figure 7 ‘RRG representation of Iatê se’t-këa (‘a possible house’)’ about here] 
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Introducing an additional layer in the RRG structure of the NP is not only needed to account for the 
constructions discussed in Sections 2.1-2.3, but has the additional advantage of making the layered 
structure of the NP more like the layered structure of the clause. In both structures there is now a 
CLAUSE/NOM layer in-between the Core and the highest node, the NP and the Sentence, 
respectively. Both have the same number of layers now, if we abstract away from the PRED node, 
which is not part of the operator projection and cannot take modifiers. The result is more elegant, 
given that the similarities between the NP and the clause were one of the main arguments to set up 
a comparable layered structure for clauses and NPs in RRG in the first place. 
 
[Insert Figure 8 ‘Comparison of the LSC and the Layered structure of the NP (extended version)’ 
about here] 
 
An additional advantage of the representation with a NOM layer over the representation with an 
extra CLAUSE layer under the NP node, is that mood operators that are restricted to the nominal 
domain, like the mirative operator such, are treated as genuine nominal categories. The 
representation is similar to the representation in Figure 7. 
 In this conception, the determiner such can be attached to different layers. In its deictic, 
identifying use, it is an operator of the NOM level. In its mirative (intensifying) use, it is an operator 
of the NP level. This double analysis is supported by the diachronic facts. The mirative use has 
developed from the identifying use (see Bolinger, 1972; Ghesquière & Van de Velde, 2011), which is a 
clear case of subjectification, the process in which representational elements are recruited for the 
expression of interpersonal meanings (see Traugott 2003, 2010 for recent accounts). Subjectification 
is basically a semantic process, but it has syntactic repercussions (see De Smet & Verstraete, 2006). 
These repercussions can be summarised as ‘rising in the layered structure’. The differential 
representation of such in the layered structure, according to its semantics, is then in line with the 
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subjectification account. Note that in formally oriented theories, mirative such is similarly 
represented under a higher projection than identifying such (see e.g. Wood, 2002). 
 The solution with the clause node under the NP node in Figure 4 can be used, however, to 
represent the obvious cases of syntactic blends or ‘grafts’ discussed in Section 2.1. The grafted clause 
can be inserted under the NP node. This would allow us to bring out the difference between (70) and 
(71) (as well as the difference between (16) and (25)). 
 
(70) He lived in … was it France? 
(71) He lived in … France? 
 
[Insert Figure 9 ‘RRG representation of graft’ about here] 
 
In FDG as well, a first attempt to account for the data in Sections 2.1-2.3 could be to supply the NP 
with a Discourse Act variable in the representation. A simple example like (72), where the NP 
Monday has its own interrogative illocution could then be represented as in (73), where the RI 
variable is wrapped in a second Discourse Act AJ that hosts the separate interrogative illocution 
(FJ:INTER(FJ)). It is naturally situated next to the Communicated Content CJ which contains as its only 
member the Referential Subact RI. 
 
(72) Let’s meet on ... Monday? (CE) 
 
(73) IL
 (MI:(AI:[(FI :HORT(FI))(CI:[(TI)(AJ:[(FJ:INTER(FJ))(CJ:(RI:Monday(RI))(CJ))](AJ))](CI))](AI))(MI)) 
 
The use of a Discourse Act variable (A) inside the Communicated Content (C) is not standard in FDG. 
The pragmatically motivated layering at the Interpersonal Level entails that inside the Communicated 
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Contents we only have Subacts, either of a referential nature (R) or of an ascriptive nature (T). If we 
abide by this restriction, there are basically two solutions: either the Discourse Act Monday? is 
promoted, so that it is directly subsumed under the Move layer, or we treat it as a Subact. Let’s 
consider each of these options in turn. 
The first alternative would be to tease apart the two Discourse Acts, and not to embed AJ 
under a variable inside AI as was the case in (73). This would yield a representation as in (74), where 
AI and AJ do not entertain a hierarchical relationship to one another under the Move layer (see 
Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:52-53). This solution is very close to the way appositional and left-
dislocated NPs are dealt with in standard FDG. As they stand outside the clause proper, they can be 
regarded as separate Discourse Acts (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:55-58). 
 
(74) IL
 (MI:[(AI:[(FI :HORT(FI))(CI:[(TI)](CI))](AI))(AJ:[(FJ:INTER(FJ))(CJ:(RI:Monday(RI))(CJ))](AJ))](MI)) 
 
At first sight, this representation seems to suggest that the two Acts are realised as separate clauses 
(Let’s meet! On Monday?), whereas in example (72) the pause after on suggests that Monday is part 
of the first Discourse Act. Still, remember that in FDG the Morphosyntactic Level is autonomous, and 
does not necessarily conform to the structure at the Interpersonal Level. The integration of the two 
Discourse Acts, which is often not fully realised, as can be deduced from the pauses, the hesitation 
markers etc., can then be taken care of dynamically at the Morphosyntactic Level. 
 A variation on the solution in (74) would be to insert a variable for the Subact Monday in the 
first Discourse Act (AI) and to add a second Discourse Act (AJ) to accommodate the interrogative 
illocution. The shared Subact (RI) of both Discourse Acts can then be amalgamated in the expression 
at the Morphosyntactic Level. This solution, spelled out in (75), is very similar to the graft analysis 
proposed in Van Riemsdijk (2001). It suffers from the disadvantage that it generates an entity at the 
Interpersonal Level that is deleted in the expression. Deletion is not a favoured option in FDG. 
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(75) IL
 (MI:[(AI:[(FI :HORT(FI))(CI:[(TI)(RI:Monday(RI)](CI))](AI))(AJ:[(FJ:INTER(FJ))(CJ:(RJ:Monday(RJ))(CJ))
](AJ))](MI)) 
 
The second alternative to (73) would be to treat Monday? as a Subact, rather than as a Discourse Act 
at the Interpersonal Level. This solution has the advantage that the Morphosyntactic representation 
is more closely aligned with the Interpersonal representation, which is preferable as ‘Discourse 
organisation’ is one of the tasks of the Interpersonal Level (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:46-47). 
If we represent Monday? as a (referential) Subact, there are two options to represent the 
interrogative illocution. Either we apply the Illocutionary Frame directly to the Subact, as in (76), or 
we treat the interrogative illocution as an operator of the Subact (ΠR), as in (77). The drawback of the 
latter representation is that operators of Referential Subacts have to do with identifiability 
(Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008:122), not with illocutionary force.  
 
(76) IL (MI:(AI:[(FI:HORT(FI))(CI:[(TI)[(FJ:INTER(FJ))(RI:Monday(RI))]](CI))](AI))(MI)) 
(77) IL (MI:(AI:[(FI:HORT(FI))(CI:[(TI)(ΠRI:Monday(RI))](CJ))](AI))(MI)) 
 
The same solution is available for mirative such (Section 2.1) and the particle toch (Section 2.2). 
Applying this solution to example (28), we arrive at the representation in (78) for the NP such a nice 
young American. Here, such is the IFID for the mirative illocution, which is represented as an 
Illocutionary Frame.28 
                                                 
28
 An alternative solution would be to treat such as an emphatic operator on the R Subact, as one reviewer 
points out. This, however, does not do full justice to the semantic affinity between intensifying such and 
mirative illocution. The difference between the emphatic operator and the mirative illocution is what 
distinguishes a real joy (or: really a joy) from such a joy. Similarly, mirative illocution at the clausal level (e.g. 
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(78) IL [(FI:MIRATIVE(FI))(–id RI:[(TI)(TJ)(TK)](RI))] 
 
Illocutionary NP modifiers like in short in (34) can either be represented as modifiers of the 
Referential Subact - the solution along the lines of what was suggested in (77) for operators - or as a 
modifier of the illocutionary variable. The former option yields a representation like (80) for the NP 
honestly a nice disposition in (79); the latter solution yields a representation like (81).29 The 
representation under (81) acknowledges that honestly modifies an illocution, but it seems to entail 
that every NP has its own illocutionary force, with Declarative illocution as a default value. This 
entailment is not necessary, however. It is also possible to insert the Illocutionary Frame only when 
there is either an overt IFID or an illocutionary adverb. This is in line with the common practice in 
FDG to only supply those variables in the representation that are actually used in a language or a 
construction. 
 
(79) I (…) got to carress [sic] a nice set of legs and a reasonable butt on a 40 year old provider 
with, honestly, a nice disposition (IC) 
 
(80) IL (–id RI:[(TI)(TJ)](RI): honestly(RI))  
(81) IL [(FI:DECL(FI): honestly(FI))(–id RI:[(TI)(TJ)](RI))] 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
What a nice car this is!) should not be confused with the emphatic declarative (e.g. This IS a nice car!). See also 
fn. 3. 
29
 The indefinite article is represented at the Interpersonal Level as an [–identifiability] operator. Nice is here 
analysed as a modifier at the Representational Level, and is thus not lexically inserted under the TI variable 
representing its Ascriptive Subact. 
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Moreover, acknowledging the possibility of a Declarative Illocutionary Frame in the NP also helps to 
account for the presence of the illocutionary particle toch in the examples in (42)-(44) (Section 2.2). 
Here, the particle is perhaps better treated as an operator, rather than a modifier of the illocution. 
The NP toch een high-res inkjet, see (44), can then be represented as (82). 
 
(82) IL [(emph FI:DECL(FI))(–id RI:[(TI)(TJ)](RI))] 
 
A further advantage of the representation in (81) over the representations in (80) is that the 
presence of an - optional - illocutionary adverb does not alter the interpersonal status of the Subact: 
a nice disposition is a Referential Subact, whether or not it is modified by honestly. What changes is 
the presence of an extra Illocutionary Frame. This is supported by the fact that non-illocutionary 
interpersonal adverbs, like for instance the reportative adverb purportedly, can modify the 
Referential Subact as well, which, following Van de Velde (2007:209-210; 2009:1025) can be 
represented as a ΣR modifier. There is no need to transform the pragmatic status of the R-variable 
into a Communicated Content in the presence of such an interpersonal adverb. This is illustrated in 
(83)-(84), in which RI represents the NP purportedly the worst Apple products of the last 10 years, and 
TI, RJ and TJ represent worst, Apple and products, respectively. 
 
(83) Here's a list of purportedly the worst Apple products of the last 10 years (IC) 
(84) IL (+id RI:[(TI)(RJ)(TJ)](RI): purportedly(RI))  
 
In the same vein, the examples of mood morphology in the NP discussed in Section 2.3 can be 
represented as ΠR operators. The NP se’t-këá in example (45) is analysed as (85), where the 
+possibility operator represents the suffix -këá. 
 
(85) IL (+possibility RI:(TI)(RI)) 
44 
 
 
In this way, FDG is able to deal with interpersonal modification of the NP by means of ‘sentence 
adverb’ modifiers in a natural way, unlike its predecessor FG, where the Interpersonal Level only 
started at the higher, clausal layers. 
In sum, no extra layering is needed in FDG, as NPs can be modified in a number of different 
ways at the Interpersonal Level. The only modification of the technical representation that is needed 
is to allow Illocutionary Frames (FI: ILL (FI)) to combine with Subacts. I see no principled, theory-
independent reason why Illocutionary Frames should be restricted to the Discourse Act only. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
While illocutionary force and epistemic modality are normally concerned with full, independent 
clauses, and are represented in the higher regions of the syntactic or semantic layered structure, 
they can sometimes relate to smaller chunks in the clause, like NPs. Such ‘micro-scope’ illocutionary 
force and illocutionary modification are attested both in English and in other languages. In this 
article, the focus was on mood marking on NPs, but other constituents can occasionally have mood 
markings as well. In (86), the AP contains an epistemic modal adverb (see also Tucker, 2001; Van de 
Velde, 2007), and in (87), the illocutionary modifier in short scopes over a PP.  
 
(86) an allegedly defamatory article (IC) 
(87) while your souls are filled with deceit, and, in short, with every wickedness (IC) 
 
In this article, the consequences of this small-scope mood operators and modifiers have been 
investigated for two structural-functional theories of language, viz. Role and Reference Grammar 
(RRG) and Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG). It turns out that a number of slight modifications to 
the standard layered structure of the NP in both theories are sufficient to adequately capture the 
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constructions with NP-internal mood. This being said, layering still proves to be a useful concept, as it 
brings out the idea that some operators and modifiers have higher scope than others, as is evidenced 
by their formal characteristics, thus linking semantic differences with syntactic differences. In other 
words, it would be ill-advised to reject the notion of layering altoghether, after having observed that 
a prototypically clause-level phenomenon like mood occasionally occurs in NPs as well. Instead, the 
data surveyed in the present paper call for an extension of the notion of layering, at least inside the 
NP. This is in fact the solution proposed in Section 4. 
The adjustment of the RRG representation boils down to adding a supplementary layer in the 
hierarchical structure of the NP. This has the additional advantage of bringing out the 
correspondence of the layered structure of the NP and the layered structure of the clause. For FDG, 
things were even less complicated. The adjustment to the FDG representation comes down to 
allowing the Illocutionary Frame to combine with a Referential Subact, instead of a Communicated 
Content. The reason why it is relatively easy to accommodate NP-internal illocution in the FDG 
representation is that the elaboration of the former FG model into the more recent FDG model 
involved a significant extension of the interpersonal aspects of the NP (see Van de Velde, 2007). By 
recognising the possibility of NP-internal illocution, both structural-functional theories converge with 
recent strands of thought in generative theory in which it has been suggested that the similarities 
between the NP and the clause comprise illocution as well (see e.g. Bennis et al., 1998:104-114; Aboh 
et al., 2010:791). This all adds to the idea that there are deep-rooted correspondences between 
clauses and NPs, not only on the syntactic level, but on the semantic level as well. 
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